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Abstract  
  
In order to tackle the question posed by the title – notoriously answered in the positive, 
among others, by Heisenberg, Margenau, Popper and Redhead – I first discuss some attempts 
at distinguishing dispositional from non-dispositional properties, and then relate the 
distinction to the formalism of quantum mechanics. Since any answer to the question titling 
the paper must be interpretation-dependent, I review some of the main interpretations of 
quantum mechanics in order to argue that the ontology of theories regarding “wave collapse” 
as a genuine physical process could be interpreted as being irreducibly dispositional. In non-
collapse interpretations, on the contrary, the appeal to dispositions is simply a way to 
reformulate the predictive content of the algorithm of the theory in a fancier metaphysical 
language. 
 
 
1. Dispositions and the interpretive task of quantum mechanics 
 
 
In trying to understand the role of propensities or dispositions, if any, in the interpretations 
of quantum mechanics (henceforth QM), I think that one can do no better than start from a 
fundamental question once posed by John S. Bell: “What are quantum probabilities 
probabilities of?”  
As I see it, this question addresses two deeply related issues, both of which are relevant 
to evaluate the role of dispositions in QM. The first is an ontological question, namely an 
attempt to connect the formal structure of quantum theory with entities in the physical world, 
in order to try to figure out what the theory is about. I take it that, in all generality, 
interpreting the mathematical formalism featuring in physical theories ought to mean:  
1.1 understanding the ontological implications of physical theories  (“the scientific image”); 
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1.2 connecting the postulated ontology with our pre-theoretical experience of the world (“the 
manifest image”).1
 In the case of QM, however, such an interpretive task is complicated by the fact that 
there is no agreed-upon “theory”, except operationally of course, or, in Bell’s words (Bell 
1990) “For All Practical Purposes (FAPP). Therefore, the interpretive task of QM cannot 
consist, contrary to what it has been often maintained, in figuring out “what the world must be 
like if quantum mechanics accurately describes it” (van Fraassen 1981, p.230, Hughes 1989, 
p. 296, Healey 1989, p.7), because we don’t know what “quantum mechanics” is without an 
explicit interpretation in the two senses above. For instance, according to some 
interpretations, QM should be supplemented with a genuine process of collapse of the wave 
function, while according to others it shouldn’t. For my purpose, it follows that the question 
of discussing the role of propensities or dispositional properties in QM can only have 
interpretation-dependent results. 
The second issue raised by Bell’s question above has to do with the meaning of the 
notion of probability, a question upon which the philosophical and scientific community so 
far has reached no agreement (see Hájek 2003). Are quantum mechanical probabilities – that 
figure so prominently in the theory – to be regarded as frequencies, propensities, or simply 
epistemic states of subjects, as in Bayesian accounts? 
Given what I said above, it should be clear why having a clear answer to the first issue 
is essential to figure out a response to the second: as is well known, if one adopts a Bohmian 
interpretation, probabilities may be regarded as merely epistemic, or due to our ignorance of 
the positions of the particles, while in collapse theories, or in the Copenhagen interpretation, 
probabilities are typically regarded as frequencies, chances, or propensities, i.e., objective 
properties or powers of individual states or events of the physical world. Consequently, in 
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what follows, I will dedicate more attention to explore the first issue by defending the 
following two claims:  
i) In dynamical reduction models à la Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986), propensities or 
dispositions might have a role, despite their (temporary?) irreducibility to non-dispositional, 
categorical properties;  
ii) In no-collapse interpretations, dispositions are dispensable: they are either reducible (as 
in Bohmian mechanics), or their ascription amounts to a mere “re-labelling” of the predictive 
content of the wave function (Bohr, Heisenberg).  
The “might” in i) can be interpreted as a concession to prudence, and therefore can be 
read in a conditional form: if there are dispositions in the quantum world, then they are at 
home in collapse theories, and in particular in the dynamical models proposed by GRW. In 
this paper, I am not trying to argue that GRW type of theories require dispositions. However, 
I am claiming that a dispositional reading of a particular version of GRW provides an 
interesting alternative to the so-called “flash ontology” presented in Tumulka (2006a and 
2006b) and in Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka, and Zanghì (2006). Furthermore, the skeptical 
conclusion in (ii) does not prevent the fact that Bohr’s interpretation can be made much 
clearer by an appeal to dispositions, especially in order to make sense of his somewhat 
obscure appeal to “mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive properties”.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. Since a basic question posed by the attempt to 
introduce dispositions in QM is to clarify the very meaning of the concept of “dispositional 
properties”, in the first section I will briefly review some of the main problems in the 
metaphysical literature on dispositions, in order to show that the distinction between 
occurrent (i.e., non-dispositional) and dispositional properties is not at all clear and sharp. 
The fact that in ordinary language no clear demarcation criterion is available pushes in two 
opposite directions: either all properties are to be treated as dispositional also in QM – sure-
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fire dispositions and propensities alike, as maintained by Suarez (2004b) –, or a clear criterion 
can be found only in the particular context of QM.  
In order to justify the legitimacy of linking the metaphysical notion of ‘disposition’ with 
the formal structure of QM, in the second section I will first discuss Clifton and Pagonis’ 
(1995) proposal to regard the dispositional properties as the contextual properties, and then 
advance my own view. In the third section, I will review recent relativistic extensions of 
GRW type of dynamic reduction theories, mainly due to Tumulka (2006a and 2006b), and 
show how the so-called “flashes ontology” of GRW type of dynamical reduction models 
could be supplemented by an ontology of irreducibly probabilistic dispositions. In the fourth, 
final section, I will discuss the sense in which non-collapse views might be interpreted in a 
dispositional fashion, and will conclude by briefly discussing the selection approach to QM 
advocated by Suarez (2004a, 2004b). Suarez’s approach deserves in fact a special discussion, 
as he claims that the passage from the possession of a purely dispositional property (like spin 
or position) to the manifestation of such a disposition in a measurement setting is a real 
physical process. And yet his theory cannot be classified among the genuine dynamical 
reduction models, as he does not provide any detailed physical story about how such a process 
should occur (the when?, how? and where? questions that a model like GRW’s tries to 
tackle).  
 
2. Is the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional properties genuine?  
 
First of all, and in order to fix terminology, I should state at the outset that in the context of 
QM “dispositions” or “tendencies” are to be interpreted as qualitative, intrinsic properties of 
physical systems. Propensities are to be regarded as probabilistic, quantitative measures of 
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the dispositions that single systems might have, say, to localize in a region of space, as in 
certain dynamical reduction models.  
Both physics and ordinary language are replete with what philosophers call dispositional 
properties (in short dispositions): think of the paradigmatic cases of ‘fragility’ ‘permeability’ 
or ‘irritability’. However, it is much more difficult to characterize the feature of such 
properties that distinguishes them from non-dispositional, or categorically possessed 
properties. And yet, a minimal success in this enterprise seems important to all interpretive 
projects trying to establish some role for dispositions in QM. If we were not able to 
distinguish dispositional from non-dispositional properties even in ordinary language, what 
would we gain by introducing dispositions in the philosophy of QM? For example, if we had 
to conclude that, from a general metaphysical viewpoint, all properties, physical and non-
physical, turned out to be dispositional,2 referring to dispositions in QM would either be 
empty (one could simply talk about properties tout court) or would deprive the philosophy of 
quantum mechanics of any vital contact with more general metaphysical issues.3  
A first attempt at distinguishing the categorical from the dispositional might be suggested 
by the fact that dispositions typically have a context of manifestation (‘glass is fragile because 
in certain situations it breaks easily’), something pushing us toward the claim that dispositions 
might be relational properties, i.e., properties that are non-intrinsic or extrinsic in Langton 
and Lewis’ sense (1998).4 However, the attempt of drawing the distinction between the 
dispositional and the non dispositional in terms of “intrinsically possessed” vs. relational or 
extrinsic fails: I agree with various scholars that a window pane would count as fragile 
independently of any breaking context, and even if it will never break (see Mumford 1998, 
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Suarez 2004b). So not only is relationality not necessary, but also not sufficient for 
dispositionality, since “being a brother” clearly does not count as a prima facie dispositional 
property. The fact that there are some apparently extrinsic dispositions, like “weight”, should 
not prevent us from acknowledging that at least some dispositions look intrinsic and non-
relational. 
This remark seems to be relevant also for the philosophy of QM, as Popper’s relationalism 
(1982) about dispositions notoriously led him to interpret quantum dispositions as relational 
properties of quantum entities, linking them to the whole experimental setup. According to 
Popper, who was obviously influenced by Bohr’s thesis about the non-separability between 
quantum entities and classical apparatuses, an isolated particle would have no dispositions 
whatsoever. It seems plausible to maintain that while the context of manifestation of fragility 
or permeability is the necessary epistemic ground to believe in the existence of the relevant 
disposition, a piece of glass would count as fragile even if it never broke, i.e., even if it never 
manifested its disposition.  
All this is well-known and basically agreed upon. However, it could be objected that in a 
different possible world, made just of glass and liquid stuff that cannot be accelerated beyond 
the speed that would be sufficient to break a pane of glass,5 glass would not count as fragile 
because no harder stuff is present Doesn’t this show that there is a certain amount of 
relationality in the property in question, as in all properties? In this case, fragility might seem 
to depend on the fact that the laws of nature in the “liquid world” prevent that liquid stuff 
from being accelerated beyond a certain speed. And if laws are dependent on local facts in 
this world, as Lewis’s best system analysis has it, there would still be a dependency of 
fragility on what else is occurring in the world and on the presence of harder stuff. And fragile 
objects would seem to be possessing their dispositional property in an extrinsic way. On the 
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other hand, if fragility were regarded as a microscopic property of glass that is – or is 
reducible to, or is fully explainable in terms of – the microscopic structure and forces of the 
crystals composing glass, then it would seem that the disposition in question could be 
ascribed to glass as one of its intrinsic properties. But the meaning of the term, in the different 
possible world made just of glass and liquid stuff in which glass never breaks, would be quite 
different.  
Be that as it may, the possible dependence of (the ascription of the property) “fragility” on 
the properties of other materials in the environment simply shows that analyzing the 
distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional in terms of the distinction between 
extrinsic and intrinsic carries the additional risk of attributing any vagueness of the latter 
distinction to the former. And this is an additional reason not to accept the above analysis. 
Another possible attempt at distinguishing dispositional from non-dispositional properties 
might consist in the fact that the former could be regarded as directly observable only in the 
context of manifestation, while the latter would be always observable. ‘Fragility’ might be the 
intrinsically possessed property of glass that becomes manifest or directly observable only 
when a piece of glass breaks, while a broken window pane displays the corresponding 
property at all times, and would therefore be always observable. Analogously, a disposition 
like permeability, unlike the property expressed by ‘being wet’, is not directly observable all 
the times, but becomes observable only when the entity exemplifying it interacts with water 
or other fluids.6  
But also this attempt at distinguishing dispositional from categorical properties fails: the 
earth’s gravitational field manifests the disposition to attract bodies toward the ground at all 
times, and not just when we observe its manifestation in falling bodies. By exerting an 
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attracting force, the earth infact keeps any object firmly attached to the ground at all times.7. 
Furthermore, to the extent that fragility and permeability are regarded as being identical with 
the microscopic, molecular structure of glasses and sponges respectively, one could note that 
such a structure can be considered to be observable at all times, albeit indirectly with the aid 
of electronic microscopes. After all, don’t we observe through a microscope?  
In a word, also this second criterion does not secure any firm ground, and fails. 
For a more fruitful attempt at indicating the distinction in question, we could look at the 
role performed in ordinary language by obviously dispositional terms. Consider dispositions 
like “irritable” or “poisonous”, which manifest themselves when people get angry and, say, 
mushrooms poison the blood. From these examples, it would seem that the function of 
dispositional terms in natural languages is to encode useful information about the way objects 
around us would behave were they subject to specific causal interactions with other entities 
(often ourselves). This remark shows that the function of dispositional predicates in ordinary 
language is essentially predictive. Consider the evolutionary advantage of classing all animals 
or people around our ancestors as “dangerous” or “innocuous”, as “peaceful” or “ferocious”. 
In learning that a particular mushroom is “poisonous”, a child learning the language also 
learns to stay away from it whenever she recognizes one.  
Clearly, this analysis of the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties can 
be correct only if it can be shown that prima facie examples of categorical terms, like ‘is 
broken’ (vs. ‘is fragile’) or ‘is dissolved in water’ (vs. “is soluble”) do not have a similar 
predictive function. And it seems to me that a distinction ‘of degree’ between the categorical 
and the dispositional can be traced in such cases. I say ‘of degree’, because any attribution of 
a property to an entity involves a certain amount of predictability, even if one does not accept 
Sellar’s and Brandom’s inferential theory of meaning (Brandom 1994). If we know that ‘salt 
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has dissolved in water’, of course we also know a good amount of things about salted water (a 
categorical state/property of the liquid),8 and this might be true simply in virtue of the fact 
that properties just are the causal powers of entities. In this case, however, any clear-cut 
distinction between dispositional properties (powers) and non-dispositional properties is also 
dissolved.  
Despite this remark, I think that it is still fair to say that in dispositional terms the 
predictive role is much more explicit or evident, a fact which could explain why natural 
languages and especially folks psychology, are so replete with predicates like jealous, 
amiable, peaceful, etc. I say ‘more evident’ because of the well-known link of dispositions 
with the modal talk presupposed by causes, counterfactuals and laws. A stone causes the 
manifestation of the disposition “fragile” (and therefore causes the breaking of the glass) 
because it causally interacts with its microscopic structure, the categorical basis of fragility 
itself. Counterfactuality is involved because the attribution of the disposition ‘soluble’ to salt 
entails that in the appropriate context, salt melts, while the regularity with which the fragility 
of glasses is manifested refers to a regularity or a law of nature capturing the behaviour of the 
micro-constituents of glass.  
In a word, the fact that we cannot analyze dispositions by using conditionals does not 
prevent us from advancing the following claim: dispositions express and encode, directly or 
indirectly, those regularities of the world around us that enable us to predict the future. If this 
is their main role and function in ordinary language, we understand why their distinction from 
intuitively non-dispositional properties is just one of degree. 
That the distinction between dispositions and categorical properties cannot be so sharp is 
further confirmed by Mumford’s analysis of the problem of the reducibility of dispositions to 
their so-called “categorical basis”. According to Mumford (1998), the difference between a 
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dispositional property like fragility and the microscopic property of glass constituting its 
categorical basis is merely linguistic, and not ontological. Referring to a property by using a 
dispositional term, or by choosing its categorical-basis terms, depends on whether we want to 
focus on, respectively, the functional role of the property (the causal network with which it is 
connected), or the particular way in which that role is implemented or realized.  
But notice that if we agree with Mumford’s analysis, it follows that it makes little sense to 
introduce irreducible quantum dispositions as ontological hypotheses. If, by hypothesis, no 
categorical basis were available, we should admit that we don’t not know what we are talking 
about when we talk the dispositional language in QM, quite unlike the cases in which we refer 
to “fragility” or “transparency”, in which the categorical bases are available and well-known. 
Introducing irreducible quantum dispositions would simply be a black-box way of referring to 
the functional role of the corresponding property, i.e., to its predictive function in the causal 
network of events.  
The upshot of this brief survey on the metaphysics of disposition should be clear. The 
predictive function of dispositions illustrated above – as well as Mumford’s view about the 
conceptual, non-ontic distinction between the categorical and the dispositional – should be 
attentively kept in mind when we will discuss the “dispositional nature” of microsystems 
before measurement, or the irreducible “dispositions to localize” possessed by microsystems 
in dynamical reduction models. 
In a word, the use of the language of “dispositions” by itself does not point to a clear 
ontology underlying the observable phenomena. On the contrary, when the dispositions in 
question are irreducible and their categorical bases are unknown, such a use should be 
regarded as a shorthand to refer to the regularity that phenomena manifest and that allow for 
a probabilistic prediction. Consequently, attributing physical systems irreducible dispositions 
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may just result in a more or less covert instrumentalism, unless the process that transforms a 
dispositional property into a categorically possessed one is explained in sufficient detail.  
In a word, friends of dispositions might end be up using an elaborate or fancy metaphysical 
language to redescribe measurement interactions, especially if they are not ready to provide a 
precise, exact physical theory about when and how a dispositional property corresponding to a 
state of a system which is not an eigenstate of the observable turns into a categorically 
possessed property. As we will see, this is the main difficulty with Bohr’s philosophy 
interpreted in a dispositional way, or with Suarez’s otherwise brilliant attempt at using 
dispositions to solve the measurement problem (2004b). 
 
3 Dispositions and categorical properties in QM 
 
The history of the attempts at introducing dispositions in QM is long and significant 
(Margenau 1954, Heisenberg 1958, Redhead 1987, Maxwell 1988), but here I will discuss 
only the two most recent attempts at linking the language of dispositions to the formalism of 
QM.9 The first is due to Clifton and Hogarth (1995) and links dispositionality to 
contextuality. The second is due to Suarez (2004b), and relates dispositions to a selective 
interpretation of QM. If one is careful enough to avoid some misleading associations of the 
word “contextual” with “relational”, I think that both are perfectly compatible with each other 
and with my own view.  
As I see it the matter, the introduction of a dispositional language in QM is based on the 
replacement of “dispositional properties” with “intrinsically indefinite properties”, i.e. 
properties that before measurement are objectively and actually “indefinite” (that is, without a 
precise, possessed value). The following two postulates express what I regard as the essential 
                                                 
9 For a review, see Dorato (2007) and Suarez (2007). 
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tenets of a dispositionalist approach to the interpretation of QM, and specify the meaning of a 
dispositional property in the context of the formalism QM: 
P1 a property of a system describable by QM is categorically possessed if and only if the 
state it corresponds to is an eigenstate of the observable. Otherwise it is dispositional. In this 
sense, mass, charge, spin are to be regarded as intrinsic, categorically possessed properties, 
since they are always definite.10  
P2 the passage from dispositional to non-dispositional magnitudes is the passage from the 
indefiniteness to the definiteness of the relevant properties, due to in-principle describable, 
genuine physical interactions of quantum systems with other systems, that typically possess a 
much larger number of particles.  
P2 in particular refers to the process that transforms an objectively, mind-independently 
indefinite magnitude into a definite one, and allows me to link the manifestation of 
dispositions with precisely described measurement interactions between quantum systems and 
larger physical systems.  
This sense of dispositionality will be adopted here in order to interpret the GRW dynamical 
reduction models from a metaphysical viewpoint, and seems quite close to what Heisenberg 
had in mind in the following, often quoted passage, which refers to the well-known thesis that 
QM reintroduces Aristotelian potentiae as intermediate “between full being and nothingness”: 
«Therefore, the transition from the ‘possible’ [dispositional] to the ‘actual’ [categorical] takes 
place during the act of observation [a correlation] … we may say that the transition from the 
‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ takes place as soon as the interaction of the object with the 
measuring device, and thereby with the rest of the world, has come into play; it is not 
                                                 
10 Here I respect the standard eigenvalue-eigenvector link. 
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connected with the act of registration of the result by the mind of the observer.» (Heisenberg 
1958, p. 54).11
The best way to justify these two postulates, and especially the second, is by briefly 
reviewing the interpretive proposals offered by Clifton and Pagonis and Suarez. 
 
3.1 Clifton and Pagonis on dispositionality as contextualism 
 
P1 is equivalent to Clifton and Pagonis’ strong contextuality. The idea of contextuality is 
simple. Assign a certain value to the square of the operator “spin in the z direction” – call it 
S2z – when it is measured together with S2x and S2y in the direction x and y. If S2z is not 
contextual, we must get the same value if we measure it together with S2x’ and S2y’, assuming 
that the direction x’ and y’ are different from x and y. Contextualism is quite widespread a 
phenomenon in QM, and it seems to entail that some QM “properties” are not sharply 
possessed before measurement, since otherwise they could not manifest themselves in 
different ways, according to the type of measurement we perform.  
Consequently, in QM we seem to have two kinds of intrinsically possessed properties, 
depending on the way the system has been prepared before measurement. If the system has a 
definite value also before measurement and the latter just reveals it with probability 1, we 
have either a non-dispositional, categorically possessed property, (a weakly contextual 
property), or we have what we could call a deterministic, “sure-fire” disposition (Suarez 
2007). On the contrary, if the value revealed by measurement causally depends on the 
interaction, we have a strong form of contextualism that, according to Clifton and Pagonis, 
implies the presence of intrinsic dispositions (Clifton and Pagonis, 1995 p. 283), or simply 
probabilistic dispositions, i.e., propensities.   
                                                 
11 Words in square brackets have been added by me and reformulate Heisenberg’s language by using the key 
terms adopted here. 
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This aspect of Clifton and Pagonis’ approach is quite similar to my first postulate above; 
put it in different words, we could also express the identification of the dispositional with the 
contextual by noting that in QM we cannot assume that there is a one-to one correspondence 
between an operator and an observable: contextualism or dispositionalism as expressed in P1 
bans a certain form of “naïve realism about operators” (Daumer, Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghí 
1996).  
The proposal to establish a significant link between contextuality and dispositionality is 
open to two objections, which, in my opinion can both be tackled.  
The first objection is based on the fact that contextuality itself has recently been the target 
of various critical remarks, especially by philosophers working in the bohmian group. They 
claim that, after all, it is quite trivial that if we perform different measurements, we are going 
to obtain different results (see Goldstein 2006, section 12). Why make such a fuss about 
contextualism? If this objection were correct, however, also dispositionalism as defined by 
Clifton and Pagonis would be a trifling matter, since it is defined in terms of the former 
notion. The second objection points to the fact that contextualism entails a kind of extrinsic-
ness or relationality of dispositions, a position that we have already rejected. Let us analyze 
these two objections in turns. 
I disagree with Goldstein’s opinion for two different reasons. First, contextuality has an 
important role as a premise of fundamental no-go theorems against the possibility of 
assigning simultaneously definite values to systems whose dimension is greater than 2 
(Kochen and Specker, 1967). And these theorems seem certainly important contributions to 
our understanding not just of the formal structure of QM, but also of the possibility of 
simultaneously attributing well-definite properties to certain quantum systems, which is part 
and parcel of the interpretive task spelled out in section 1. The fact that we can deny the 
significance of these theorems for QM only by endorsing contextuality/dispositionality 
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(alternatively, by denying non-contextuality) is not a trifling matter. In classical physics, 
measurements typically do reveal pre-existing properties, and the fact that in quantum 
systems before measurement one cannot rely on categorically possessed properties in the 
sense given above by P1) and P2) cannot be deemed as being without significance. 
The second counter-objection is that the superposition principle is the distinguishing mark 
of QM with respect to classical mechanics (Dirac 1930), and superpositions are not ignorance 
interpretable. It follows that the passage from “the dispositional” to “the actual/categorically 
possessed” is a very important feature of QM, because it is the passage that takes us from a 
superposition of states to one particular state with a certain probability. Such a passage is 
obviously involved in the process of measuring a quantum entity in a superposed state, which 
is arguably the central aspect of the theory that still needs to be explained.  
Going now to the second objection, what is instead potentially misleading about 
identifying dispositionalism with contextualism is the fact that contextual properties seem to 
have been identified with extrinsic, relational properties, contrary to what was argued in 
section 2. If the value of the spin measured on Sx2 depends on whether we observe it with Sy2 
or Sy’2, there seems to be a clear sense in which not only is the spin in question not possessed 
before measurement, but the disposition itself (i.e., the property of manifesting a definite spin 
in a given direction) depends on other properties of other entities. However, we should notice 
that it is the manifestation of the spin that is relational, not the disposition itself, which is as 
intrinsic at it may be.  
A simple example, made by Albert (1992), will help us to make the point. If we reverse the 
polarity of a magnet of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, and measure the spin of a particle that is in 
a superposition of spin in the z direction, we obtain a result that is opposite to what we 
obtained before the reversal. The very same intrinsically possessed disposition can, depending 
on what measurement we perform, be manifested in different ways, for the simple reason that 
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there is no preexisting definitely possessed property of having spin in the z direction. So there 
is a legitimate way to defend the (correct) view that dispositionality is as intrinsic as it may 
be. 
 
3.2 Suarez on dispositions 
 
Suarez construes dispositions in QM in a similar manner, but links his understanding of 
dispositions to Fine’s proof of the unsolvability of the measurement problem (Suarez 2004b). 
According to Suarez, dispositions are possessed by quantum systems all the time, even when 
they are not manifest, and this agree with the previous point that dispositions are intrinsic 
properties of quantum systems. Importantly, selections are a subclass of measurements, since 
while the latter are interactions with all the properties of a quantum system, selections pick 
out just one of the many intrinsic dispositions of quantum systems.  
There is one minor difference between Suarez’s view and my definition P1, as in a recent 
paper he introduces sure-fire dispositions:« If object O possesses the deterministic propensity 
D with manifestation M then: were O to be tested (under the appropriate circumstances C1, 
C2, … etc) it would definitely M with probability one.» (2007, p. 23 of the manuscript).12 
This would entail that preparing a system in state ψ and measuring it afterwards would count 
as measuring a sure-fire disposition rather than a categorical property.  
Although this difference might seem purely terminological, I prefer to refer to use 
“disposition” for properties of entities whose state is not an eigenstate of the observable, i.e., 
for properties that are sharply possessed. First of all, my choice helps to focus on “the 
collapse” of a state ψ in superposition as a transition from indefiniteness to definiteness of 
properties, rather than as a transition from propensities to sure-fire dispositions. Furthermore, 
                                                 
12 I thank Suarez for having sent me his manuscript. 
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in bohmian mechanics the particles’ positions would count as a dispositional properties in 
Suarez view (“a sure-fire disposition”), and their difference with spin would be specifiable 
simply in terms of a probabilistic rather than a deterministic descriptions. On the contrary, if 
we accept the view that we have dispositions relative to observable O whenever we do not 
have previous values for O = n
n
nn vva∑ , the interesting question will of course become 
whether dispositions are reducible to some kind of categorical basis, as it is the case with 
Bohmian mechanics, or are not so reducible, as it is in the case in other interpretations to be 
discussed. 
There is one last objection that we must discuss before broaching the GRW’s ontology 
from a dispositionalist viewpoint: what sense does it make to claim that a system has a 
dispositional property when it lacks a precise value for that quantity? Shouldn’t we say that 
when a physical system lacks a precise value before measurement, not only there is no 
corresponding categorical property, as it is obvious, but also that there is no dispositional 
property either? Shouldn’t we say that talking of properties, even if dispositional ones, is 
made obsolete by QM’s contextuality, and that we should not pour old metaphysical wine in 
the new barrels provided by mathematical physics? (Daumer, Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì 
1996)  
Well, claiming that a quantum system in a superposition of spin has a disposition for 
acquiring a precise spin even when if it has no precise spin is at the heart of a dispositional 
reading of QM. But we should admit that claiming that a system has no precisely possessed 
property at all before measurement, and that it possesses a disposition to manifest a definite 
property after a correlation with a larger system, should not be regarded as two perfectly 
equivalent ways of speaking. In the latter description, we are finding a request of explaining 
something that we still don’t understand in detail, namely the existence of a genuine transition 
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from a potentiality to actuality that is to be regarded as a real physical process, and which 
should be further studied with the experimental and technical resources of physics. 
Accepting the claim that a quantum entity is to be (currently) regarded as a node of 
dispositions is not a crazy idea, as long as this way of speaking presents some advantages 
relatively to the other, non-property talk. But what kind of advantage can it be, considering 
that dispositions, typically, don’t explain much? Are we back to the virtus dormitiva 
explanation? This is what we will have to inquire in the next section. 
 
4  Adding dispositions and propensities to GRW  
 
I should make clear from the start that GRW’s dynamical reduction models do not 
explicitly rely on dispositions. However, neither do they exclude their existence. In order to 
see what we could gain by introducing a dispositional language, I will therefore try to 
summarize the main features of the best known dynamical reduction models by relying on a 
language introducing irreducible propensities.  
According to one of the non-relativistic versions of the dynamical reduction models 
proposed by GRW (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1986), each micro-system has an irreducible 
probabilistic disposition – a propensity – to localize in a region of space given by a diameter 
of σ = 10-5 cm, in average once every 1016 sec. The probability of a decay per second is 
therefore 1/τ  = 1/1016. These two parameters become two new constants of nature, and 
specify to what and how often the localization process occurs.  
Obviously, if the system is composed only by one particle, this can remain unlocalized in 
average for 100 million years (approximately corresponding to 1016 sec), but since the 
propensity for a localization is defined with a Poisson distribution such that the probability for 
the localization of N particles is N/τ, a system made of N = 1023 particles will undergo in 
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average 107 localizations per second, and will therefore remain in a dispositional, superposed 
state for less than 10-7 seconds. Accordingly, in a cubic centimetre, there are than 107 = 
1023/1016 localized events of localization, or “flashes”, which ensure and explain the 
localization of the macroscopic objects with which we are familiar. 
The localization of a whole system is a consequence of the fact that even if a system is in 
a dispositional, superposed state, the multiplication of the wave function by a Gaussian 
localization operator (“the hit”) effectively kills the other components of the superposition 
that are not located close enough to the center of localization.  
Analogously, in the relativistic extension of the GRW theory, due to Tumulka (2006a and 
2006b), we are given a set of localization events (flashes) and a rule for calculating the 
probability for the next flash to occur as specified by the wave function.13 Here is how J. S. 
Bell summarized this flashy view of the physical universe: «However, the GRW jumps 
(which are part of the wave function, not something else) are well localized in ordinary space. 
Indeed each is centred on a particular spacetime point (x, t). So we can propose these events 
as the basis of the “local beables” of the theory. These are the mathematical counterparts in 
the theory to real events at definite places and times in the real world …. A piece of matter 
then is a galaxy of such events.» (Bell 1987, p. 205). 
In a different model of the theory, the fundamental entity is a scalar field ρ = ρ (r, t) 
defined on Newtonian spacetime, with ρ being, at the macroscopic scale, what we call mass 
density of physical objects. In this interpretation, the wave function ψ(r1, …rn, t) describes the 
system at a given time, and the square modulus of ψ determines, for each particles i, how 
much stuff (ρi) there is in a given cell: (r,t)ρmρ(r,t) i
i
i∑=
                                                
. Even though the density of 
microscopic objects can be in a superposed, dispositional state and therefore enjoy “the 
 
13 Interestingly, in this flash model there is no need of postulating a privileged frame for the localization, as it 
happens with the model in which the mass-density localize. Still, the model suffers from other difficulties on 
which here I cannot enter. 
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cloudiness of waves”, due to the localization mechanisms the mass density of macroscopic 
objects acquires a precise value in a split second, and the object localizes somewhere via an 
irreducibly stochastic event.  
We should notice that while the wave function leaves in an abstract 3N dimensional space, 
the flashes and the scalar field are both in spacetime, since they are localized wherever the 
collapse events occur. Important for the purpose of introducing irreducible propensities is the 
remark that the time and place of the localization processes (their center of collapse), as well 
as the particular particle or cell that is involved, are chosen at random, and so the localizations 
themselves are to be regarded as “spontaneous”, or simply uncaused. The crucial question at 
this point is: if this is correct and intended in the model, why introducing dispositions or 
single-case propensities, if the latter are regarded as causes of the localizations that are 
“inherent” in each microsystem?  
First of all, propensities need not be presented as causes of the localization process, since 
we cannot rule out that the collapse be “spontaneous”, or uncaused. Admittedly, there is 
nothing in the formalism of GRW suggesting this reading, and if the theory remains 
“phenomenological” as it is now, the propensity theorist is happy to accept that the real 
tendency that each single microsystem has to localize is irreducible, but still needed to 
attribute single case probabilities to individual particles. In this hypothesis, it would make 
sense to say that a universe composed by a single proton would harbour a particle with a 
disposition to localize once every 100 million years: no reference to ensembles of particles 
would be possible and therefore no frequencies. In our universe, frequencies would simply be 
supervenient on, and a manifestation of, such individually possessed propensities. 
Frigg and Hoefer (2007), however, have argued that a Humean Best System (HBS) analysis 
of GRW’s probabilities is more plausible than a dispositionalist analysis, and that single case 
propensities are not needed to defend the view that the probabilities introduced by GRW are 
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as objective and as non-epistemic as it gets. (Frigg, Hoefer 2007). After all, HBS’ chances are 
based on all the local facts in the universe’s entire history, and are therefore not to be 
conflated with subjective degrees of belief as in Bayesian probabilities. Since HBS chances 
have a factual grounding, they must be regarded as “objective”. Only, these local facts in the 
universe history are to be conceived non-dispositionally; probabilities, consequently, do not 
have a grounding in modally conceived propensities or powers.  
However, it seems to me that the main weakness of a HBS analysis of GRW probabilities 
depends on its reliance on Lewis’ analysis of the nature of laws of nature. If GRW 
probabilities depend on the probabilistic laws organized within a HBS of the theory, but such 
laws are, as Lewis has it, supervenient on the local, non-modal facts of the history of the 
entire universe, how can we make sense of conditional probabilities, which refer to relations 
among state of affairs, and therefore to universal? In my view of laws, law-statements are 
made true by, or more prudently, simply refer to, the dispositions or causal powers possessed 
by physical systems (Dorato 2005). From this viewpoint, it is not clear how a HBS reading of 
the GRW theory can defend an objectivist view of probabilities or chances (namely, a non-
subjectivist, non-Bayesian approach allowing us to go beyond states of beliefs) without 
committing itself to some mind-independent property or relations that microsystems have, 
and therefore, in a plausible view of properties or relations, to dispositions or causal powers.  
In Lewis’ original idea, what propensity theorists call “disposition to collapse” really 
refers instead to the whole mosaic of local states of affair, on which collapse laws supervene 
as axioms or theorems of a single theory combining simplicity and strength. However, not 
only are simplicity and strength language-dependent virtues, but they are also 
intersubjectively shared but merely epistemic virtues. Laws in HBS denote nothing but lists or 
histories of events or occurrent facts, and it is not clear at all whether the Humean mosaic 
includes or not properties or universals. This alternative generates a dilemma. 
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If we opt for the former, nominalistic reading of HBS (no property are admitted in the 
HBS/Lewisian ontology) there are troubles that cannot be overcome. As anticipated before, 
the probability of the next flash given a set of flashes and the initial wave function is a 
conditional one, so what we really have is a relation between them. Now, how can we claim 
that this conditional probability describes something in an objective way and is not epistemic 
if it doesn’t refer to such a relation but is simply about a bunch of disconnected, local states of 
affairs? The question is that if HBS theorists granted that laws in HBS describe relations, they 
would have thereby overcome nominalism, and therefore one of the main motivations of an 
HBS’ analysis of laws and probabilities.  
But perhaps there is nothing inherent in the Lewisian point of view that rules out 
properties being part of the Humean mosaic, as long as they are conceived as occurrent 
properties, as opposed to modal ones.14 Modally conceived properties would infact be 
dispositions or propensities. And this is the second horn of the dilemma: on a reasonable view 
of properties, in fact, X is a property of Y if and only if X is a causal power of Y or X is 
identified by the causal powers of Y (Shoemaker 1984). And modally conceived properties or 
propensities have to be readmitted again also by the HBS theorist.  
Well, maybe we should not saddle the interpretation of quantum probabilities with 
complicated metaphysical questions about the identity conditions for properties. But even if 
we granted this point, there seems to be another difficulty looming for the HBS reading of the 
GRW’s chances. It is not clear to me how, without asking some help from actual frequentism 
about actual histories, one is going to distinguish between chancy histories governed by 
probabilistic laws from “deterministic histories” governed by sure-fire laws. But since Frigg 
and Hoefer correctly claim that an appeal to frequentism is a non-starter for GRW, shouldn’t 
they be committed to the existence of propensities in order to make sense of objectivist 
                                                 
14 This objection has been voiced by Roman Frigg. 
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chances, in the same sense in which Lewis himself is committed to universals in order to add 
some objectivist constraint to the simplicity and strength of our chosen language? (Lewis 
1984).  
Frigg and Hoefer could reply that frequencies are part of the Humean mosaic and hence 
ground probability claims. The difference between HBS and frequentism is that the former 
position does not assign probabilities solely on the basis of frequencies and also takes other 
epistemic virtues into account (simplicity, strength, etc). In this way the HBS theorist may 
drop the notion of a Kollektiv, which causes well-known troubles to the von Mises type 
frequentist. But this does not mean the HBS theorist is oblivious of frequencies, or that he 
needs resort to propensities.15  
However, note that virtues like simplicity or strength are possibly intersubjectively shared, 
but are at best a guide to discover mind-independent facts, as they are epistemic and language-
dependent virtues. In conclusion, the only grip on mind-independent probabilities that the 
HBS theorist has is yielded by frequencies: the HBS position seems either to collapse on 
frequentism with all its known problems, or onto epistemic views of probability close to 
bayesianism. 
An additional important reason to introduce propensities in GRW should be considered: in 
the mass density version of the theory, we could try to defend the view that the propensities to 
localize that each microsystem possesses allow to explain the definiteness of the macroworld, 
in the sense that they allow a unification of the micro and the macro-world, characterized by a 
unique dynamics.16 And in the flash version of the theory, where macroscopic objects are 
collections of “hits”, we could redescribe the ontological assumption of the theory by saying 
that quantum, microscopic objects are a collection of propensities to localize in a small region 
of space. In both versions, according to GRW, QM is a universal theory, governed by a 
                                                 
15 This objection was raised by Frigg. 
16 For the theory of explanation as unification, see Friedman (1974), and Kitcher (1976). 
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modified, non-linear Schrödinger’s equation. “Universal” here means that it applies to the 
micro and macro-world: while single particles or the microscopic density of stuff may be in 
superposed states for a long time, despite their propensity to localize, macroscopic bodies are 
a collection of localization processes.  
However, there are two objections to the view that propensities in GRW might explain. 
One is that all dispositions are in general explanatory empty, the other is that in our particular 
case the explanatory work is really performed by the actual flashes or by the localization of 
mass density, which are events or processes in spacetime. To the extent that GRW explains by 
unifying, it is flashes or the localization process of the mass density that “unify”, not the 
propensities to localize, which are unnecessary. Let us quickly analyze these objections.  
The first objection is well-known: do I explain why a piece of glass broke by pointing to 
its fragility? Well, if I know what fragility refers to (the microscopic structure of certain 
stuff), I do explain why this piece of glass broke by mentioning its fragility, but simply 
because fragility refers to the structure of glass. However, since the alleged propensity to 
localize in GRW is ungrounded – according to GRW collapses are spontaneous and there is 
no hidden mechanism for them – how can I claim to explain the localization by adducing an 
ungrounded disposition? Nevertheless, if I claim that a cloth is impermeable and know 
nothing about the fabric of the stuff it is made of, there is a sense in which I do explain why I 
did not get wet, even though for a deeper explanation I need to revert to chemistry. If we 
agree that explanations have a pragmatic component, and can be regarded as answers to why-
questions that depend on the knowledge state of the questioners, why would the piece of 
information that the coat is impermeable to water fail to provide a prima facie explanation for 
why I did not get wet? If I did not know that the coat was impermeable, coming to know this 
makes me understand why something occurred. For sure, the kind of information provided by 
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dispositions is weakly explanatory, but in some circumstances it can be regarded as providing 
comprehension. 
In the case of the second objection, it must be admitted that the localization process and 
the propensity to localize are equivalent in terms of unification: we can either describe an 
object as a swarm of flashes, or depict it as made of particles with a propensity to localize. 
Equivalently for the mass density version of the theory. The unification is realized in both 
ways of speaking: if propensities are not indispensable, however, they cannot be ruled out 
either. 
Three final advantages of the propensity talk can be mentioned: if the propensities to 
localize are metaphysically prior to the localization events, and, contrary to Allori, Goldstein 
Tumulka and Zanghì (2006), are “metaphysically primitive”, we can presuppose that 
localization events are something that occurs to microsystems in both versions of the theory. 
And then, by starting with continuants endowed with propensities we might have a better 
chance to reconstruct a more stable notion of our familiar objects, as bare flashes could not be 
sufficient17 (see Frigg and Hoefer 2007).  
Second, if do not consider the manifestation of the disposition (i.e., the flash itself) as 
explanatorily ultimate, but leave the room open for a future grounding of the disposition to 
localize, we may have heuristic reasons to develop GRW, which is still a merely 
phenomenological theory, into a deeper theory, possibly invoking noise coming from 
gravitational phenomena (quantum gravity). 
Third: we do not take into our ontology the configuration space, as Albert and Clifton and 
Monton did also for GRW: in order to make sense of the role of the wave functions, 
propensities to localize are enough.18  
                                                 
17 This objection is voiced by Frigg and Hoefer (2007), without attempting to counter it. 
18 A similar point has been advocated by Suarez for Bohm’s ontology (2007). 
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While it must be admitted that none of these three arguments is knock-down, there is little 
doubt that if we characterize dispositions as we did in the second section, the transition from 
the indefinite to the definite required by P2 in the present case is illustrated by a theory that is 
exact in the sense of Bell, as it tells us precisely how often and where the propensity to 
localize is manifested. It is in this sense that GRW is the best illustration of Heisenberg’s idea 
that QM reintroduces potentiae and subsequent transitions to actuality: if we believe that 
system before measurements do not have precise values, GRW’s postulation of propensities 
to localize gives us a reason to believe why objects have definite properties when we look at 
them. 
 
5 Dispositions in (some) non-collapse models: Bohr’s interpretation 
 
Despite the fact that trying to figure out what Bohr really thought about QM is a 
difficult, if not desperate enterprise, there seem to be two main readings of his approach.  
The first comes from a peculiar combination of neopositivist and kantian influences, the 
second, too often neglected, is based on a dispositionalist reading of his principle of 
complementarity, to be proposed in the remainder or this section.  
The neopositivist strand comes from an application of Einstein’s analysis of the notion 
of simultaneity (1905) within the context of the measurement process of QM. Exactly as, 
according to Einstein, it is meaningless to claim that two events are simultaneous, unless we 
have specified a particular operational criterion to establish when and in which circumstances 
two spacelike-related events are to be regarded as “co-occurring”, according to Bohr it is 
meaningless to attribute a definite property to a quantum system unless we specify a classical 
measurement context.  
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Such a first reading of Bohr’s understanding of a quantum system before measurement 
is authoritatively preferred, for example, by Michael Redhead (1987, pp. 49-51). Jan Faye, 
stressing as he does that Bohr was an entity realist while accepting a form of antirealism about 
QM as a theory19 (Faye 1991), could certainly concur with the view that according to the 
danish physicist it is meaningless to attribute before, and independently of, measurement any 
kind of properties to quantum systems. 
The Kantian strand of this first reading comes from the possibility of considering the 
classical language with which we describe the measurement apparatuses as a transcendental 
condition of possibility to refer to the quantum, noumenal world. Notice that classical 
apparatuses and quantum entities for Bohr are inseparable, due to the non-divisible nature of 
the quantum of action that is exchanged between the two. Now, if we really wanted to 
develop an analogy with Kant’s theory of knowledge, we should say that the Kantian 
categories and the pure forms of intuition are to phenomena of the outer world like the 
classical apparatuses are to the quantum world. Exactly as the «phenomena» for Kant are the 
way in which the noumenal world appears to minds endowed with pure forms and categories 
like ours, the manifestation of the quantum world via the choice of a classically describable 
apparatus must be regarded as an inextricable relation between the noumenal unknowable 
quantum world and a non-quantum, classical measurement system.  
Such a Kantian strand can somehow introduce the second dispositional reading of Bohr 
that I want to broach now and that I prefer. According to Bohr, two properties are 
complementary if and only if they are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive (see Murdoch 
1987). I take that this slogan is a central part of Bohr’s interpretation of QM. We say that they 
are mutually exclusive because, from the point of view of the classical language, they can be 
attributed to the same system at the same time only via a contradiction: in classical terms, 
                                                 
19 This means that the wave function for him was simply a bookkeeping devise good for predictions, but 
theoretical entities existed in a mind independent fashion 
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nothing can be both a particle and wave (if we regard “having position” and “being a wave” 
as referring to categorical properties).  
However, from a dispositional point of view, if we refer to a quantum entity, this duality 
is perfectly legitimate, because we can attribute the same particle at the same time (i.e., before 
measurement) a disposition for a particle-like behaviour and a disposition for a wave-like 
behaviour. Such dispositions are later selected by the kind of experiment we wish to perform. 
The choice of this word “selection” in not casual, as Suarez bases his dispositionalist 
approach to QM on the view that measurements chooses or selects a particular, intrinsic 
disposition of the quantum entity (Suarez 2004b). This shows, by the way, that his view is not 
at all too distant from Bohr’s as I presented it here.  
The presence of two dispositions is the reason why in a double-split experiment, 
complementary properties like the trajectory of the particle (its position) and the interference 
pattern cannot be simultaneously revealed by the same experiment, given that any apparatus 
obeys classical physics. Either we know the split through which the particle went, but we 
destroy the pattern of interference, or we save the interference, but cannot know where the 
particle went. 
On the other hand, if we refer to a quantum system before measurement, the 
complementary properties must be regarded as jointly exhaustive, because any attempt at 
attributing a not-yet measured system only one of the two properties would yield an 
incomplete description of the quantum system. In a word, an electron is neither a particle nor 
a wave, but has dispositional features belonging to both concepts.  
Despite lack of direct evidence for the interpretation of Bohr that I am suggesting, I think 
that it is not absurd to attribute to an entity realist like Bohr the view that microsystems have 
real tendencies to display well-defined measurement values in a given experimental context, 
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that somehow “extract” some “latent aspect” from a mind-independent entity. In this way, 
Bohr’s reading would not differ too much from Heisenberg’s. 
At this point, it should be obvious why also my second claim seems to be supported. If we 
attribute a micro-system M a “real disposition” to show a certain definite value in a 
measurement context described by a classical apparatus, we explain away certain apparent 
contradictions of his philosophy, of which he has been accused even by Bell (1989). The 
problem of a dispositional talk is that in the context of his philosophy it does not improve the 
physics, as it just amounts to saying that if we measure a quantum system in a superposition 
with a particularly prepared physical system, we get a definite result. Since we are not told 
how, when and why such a definiteness comes into being, the corresponding lack of exactness 
seems fatal to a realistic project of understanding the physical world.  
Despite the introduction of dispositions, all well-known problems of Bohr’s philosophy 
remain intact, in particular whether the distinction between the classical and the quantum 
world is pragmatical and contextual, or is rather physically describable in a precise way.20 In 
the former case, Bohr’s solution to the measurement problem, even with the addition of 
intrinsic dispositions for position, momentum, spin, etc, is fine for all practical purposes but is 
simply an instrumentalistic manoeuvre, covered with a realistic-tasting spice, given by the 
introduction of dispositions. Of course, there is nothing wrong with instrumentalism per se, 
but it should be recognized that adding dispositions to a philosophy that, like Bohr’s, denies 
the reality of the collapse, simply adds coherence to his view of QM without increasing our 
understanding of the physical world. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The complaint that Bohr’s philosophy relies on an unclear distinction between the classical and the quantum 
has been notoriously voiced by J.S.Bell (1987). 
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5.2 Suarez’s selective approach to the measurement problem 
  
Unfortunately, the same analysis holds also for Suarez approach to dispositions as 
selections: «A selection is an interaction designed to test a particular disposition (Fine’s 
“aspect”) of a quantum system. Among the dispositional properties I include those 
responsible for values of position, momentum, spin and angular momentumIn a selection, the 
pointer position interacts only with the property of the system that is under test» (Suarez, 
2004b, p.232). In order to represent a given dispositional property, Suarez claims that we can 
exploit the fact that «for every property of a quantum system originally in a superposition 
there is a mixed state which is probabilistically equivalent (for that property) to the 
superposition» (ibid, p. 242). Take for instance the two following states, representing 
respectively the pure state of spin along x, and the mixture W(x): 
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Suarez supposes that the pointer position interacts with only one property of the system W 
(O), in the example represented by W(x), with O being a particular observable, in our case 
“spin along x”. W(O) is not the full state of the system, but simply the state corresponding to 
its property O. 
Now, I think the decisive question to ask is the following: how does a selection of a 
disposition occur, namely is the selection a physical process? If we deny that selections are 
physical process, the ascription of dispositions to quantum systems is deprived of any interest. 
By taking this horn of the dilemma, of course we don’t have to provide detailed explanations 
of the selection process, but the ascription of dispositions that are selected by the 
measurement apparatus looks like a merely formal trick to give an account of the transition 
from pure states to mixtures. It is a solution by fiat, so to speak. 
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On the other hand, by taking the other horn of the dilemma and accepting that selections 
are genuine physical processes,21 then we need to know more about them, in terms of a more 
precise, exact physical description, of the kind provided by dynamical reduction models. 
Namely, a description that can, in principle, be tested by experiments, even thought the 
experiment that we can actually perform are not capable of testing the theory. If we claim that 
a measurement “selects” the appropriate disposition via a genuine physical interaction, we 
either have the duty to formulate physical hypotheses as to the when, how and why, quantum 
systems go from a superposition (which is not ignorance-interpretable) to a well-defined value 
(and then we embrace dynamical reduction models of the GRW type), or we must argue that 
no such description is possible. But the latter choice is tantamount to give up the hope of 
explaining what happens in a measurement interaction. Furthermore, if we don’t describe the 
selective process in a more detailed way, we end up treating measurements as special physical 
interactions and this is certainly unwanted.  
In other words, claiming that measurements are selections of dispositions without 
providing physical descriptions of the selecting, genuinely real physical process amounts to 
sweeping the dust under the carpet. In practice, this would be equivalent to adopting an 
instrumentalist solution to the measurement problem, which is certainly not in the intention of 
a proponent of the view that dispositions are real, intrinsic properties of quantum systems.  
In a word, we should conclude that selections are an interesting but purely provisional 
account of measurement interactions. Contrary to the author’s intentions, Suarez’s alleged 
solution to the measurement problem is very similar to Bohr’s, and in order to avoid this trap, 
he needs to supplement his account with a detailed theory of collapse that can in principle be 
refuted by experiments: Suarez’s dispositional reading of QM is really committed in some 
way to the program of dynamical reduction models 
                                                 
21 This is the Suarez’s position (personal communication). 
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 This conclusion can perhaps be better supported if we conclude by briefly surveying 
Rovelli’s relational account of quantum interactions. According to Rovelli, it is meaningless 
to attribute an intrinsic, absolute property to a non-correlated system, since “S has q” is true 
only for observer/physical system O and may not be true for O’. To the extent that «a variable 
(of a system S) can have a well-determined value q for one observer (instrument) (O) and at 
the same time fail to have a determined value for another observer (O’)» (Rovelli and Laudisa 
2002, sect. 2), in this interpretation of QM no sense can be made of any non-dispositional, 
categorically possessed properties. We could certainly interpret Rovelli’s view (and 
Everettian views, to that effect) as a way to deny the existence of any categorically possessed 
property, and as a way to regard entities as loci of purely dispositional properties, whose 
manifestation is completely dependent on the kind of entity they correlate with. 
Notice however, that also this view is hardly explanatory; despite the centrality of the 
notion of correlation or relative state in Rovelli and Everett’s view, there is explicitly no 
intention to offer a clear hypothesis as to how and when do the correlations occur. Rovelli’s 
view is therefore not different from a form of instrumentalism about the descriptive content of 
the theory which we have already found in Bohr.  
Finally, there is no need of arguing that another important no-collapse view, Bohmian 
mechanics, renders dispositions wholly dispensable: Bohm’s dispositions (the so-called 
contextual variables) are in fact reducible to positions and context of measurement (Clifton 
and Pagonis 1995).  
In sum, if dispositions have a role in the metaphysical foundations of QM, they must be 
looked for in GRW kind of theories. Elsewhere, they might contribute to the coherence of an 
instrumentalist rendering of the theory, but do not help us at all in the interpretive effort that is 
the task of the philosophy of physics as delineated in the first section of the paper.  
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